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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ENGINEERII\TG COMMISSION, D. 
I-I. WHITTENBURG, Chairman, H. 
l. CORLEISSEN and LAYTON 
11AXFIELD, Members of the Engi-
neering Cotnmission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FRED TED·ESCO and KLEA B. TE-
DESCO, his wife, et al, 
Defendants, 
and 
BIRD & EVANS, INC. 
Counter-claimants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8249 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
INTRODUCTORY 
This case was tried before a jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Hon. Ray Van 
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Cott presiding. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
counter claimants in the amount of $30,500.00. Thereafter the 
Court entered an Order granting the Motion of the plaintiffs 
and respondents for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
This appeal is taken from such Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute between the parties here as to whether 
or not the appellants have been damaged by the condemnation 
of the property taken for the c CThis is the Place'' monument. 
The only question is whether or not such damages are com-
pensable under the law. 
Prior to the 11th day of July, 1951, Wagner Improvement 
Company, a corporation which was organized for the purpose 
of planning and developing certain properties belonging to 
the Charles H. Deere estate, was the owner of approximately 
180 acres of land on the eastern boundary of Salt Lake City. 
Bird & Evans, Inc., the appellants herein, were the owners of 
approximately 35 acres of land east of and immediately adjoin-
ing the land of Wagner Improvement Company (R. 70). The 
map which is attached to this brief as an appendix shows the 
relative location of these two tracts. In the middle 1940's, the 
Wagner Improvement Company and the predecessors in in-
terest of Bird & Evans, Inc., Mr. and Mrs. William Webb, set 
about the work of planning and developing an exclusive sub-
division to be known as Oak Hills Subdivision to cover both 
the lands owned by the Wagner Improvement Company and 
the lands owned by the Webbs (R. 71). During the course of 
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the development, Bird & Evans, Inc., was formed, which com-
pany acquired the land from the Webbs, the W ebbs retaining 
an interets therein. 
The work of planning and development of the subdivision 
went on uninterrupted by this transfer of title. Mr. Dean 
F. Brayton, a Salt Lake attorney was Vice-President of Wag-
ner Improvement Company and the manager of their activities 
in the state of Utah. He was also attorney for the Webbs and 
later became attorney for Bird & Evans, Inc., for the purpose 
of carrying out the development ·of the subdivision. Mr. A. B. 
Paulsen, an architect and subdividing consultant, was jointly 
employed by the Webbs and the Wagner Improvement Com-
pany, and later, after Bird & Evans, Inc., came into existence, 
Mr. Paulsen became a stockholder and officer in Bird & Evans, 
Inc. 
It was agreed between the owners of the two properties 
that Mr. Paulsen and Mr. Brayton should represent both sides 
in planning and carrying out the subdivision development (R. 
78-79). It was further agreed that the costs of planning would 
be divided between the owners of the two tracts of land in 
proportion to their land holdings, and, in fact, the very con-
siderable expense entailed in planning was so borne and was 
so paid (R. 72). As to the installation of improvements on 
the subdivision, it was agreed that the costs of installation of 
these improvements would be borne by the owners of the lots 
within the subdivision abutting the particular improvement in 
question (R. 82). Restrictive covenants were drawn up by Mr. 
Brayton and agreed upon by the owners of both properties 
to be placed in effect as the plats were recorded and accepted 
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in the office of the County Recorder. These restrictive covenants 
appeared in evidence as Exhibit 8 and generally litnited use 
of the property in question to high grade residence units, some 
minor exceptions being made for comn1ercial areas. The work 
of planning of said subdivision was completed son1etime prior 
to July 11, 1951 and the work of development thereof was 
underway at that time. Exhibits 1 to 7 inclusive are a few of 
the many maps and drawings which were prepared en this 
project. Exhibit 3 is a survey which was made by Mr. Thomas 
Heath in 1948. Mr. Heath at the time of the tri~l was right-
of-way agent for the state of Utah and appeared at all times 
in court during the trial of this case as a representative of the 
state of Utah. 
From an examination of these exhibits, it is clear that 
the Bird & Evans property and the Wagner Improvement prop-
erty were considered by the planners as a single piece of prop-
erty and planning and development work thereon was pro-
ceeding as if no difference in ownership existed. In fact it will 
be seen from an examination of Exhibit 1 that along the border 
line of the two tracts the lots were subdivided so that individual 
lots lay partly in the Bird & Evans tract and partly in the 
Wagner Improvement Company tract. No attention was paid 
at all by the planners and developers to the property line be-
tween the two tracts. They proceeded as if it were not there 
and as if the entire tract were of common ownership. 
Because of the fact that the market could absord each 
year only a limited number of lots of this high quality, and 
because of the further fact that subdivided land generally 
takes a higher valuation for tax purposes than does unsub-
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divided land, the planners and developers jointly agreed that a 
plat of the entire subdivision should not be filed but that the 
subdivision should be divided into a number of plats. Each 
plat should be filed individually and should be developed and 
placed on the market before an additional plat should be filed. 
The restrictive covenants which it had been agreed should be 
applicable to all plats were made of record as to each plat at 
the time the plat in question was filed. 
The Wagner Improvement Company property lay partly 
on the north side and partly on the south side of Emigration 
Cayon. The Bird & Evans property lay entirely on the south 
side of the canyon. At the time of the filing of the condemna-
tion action by the state on July 11, 1951, the plats to the area 
lying north of the canyon had been recorded and partially 
sold out. The plats on the area south of the canyon, those af-
fecting both properties, had not yet been filed. Mr. Brayton 
testified that he believed that the demand for residential prop-
erty would have warranted the filing of these plants and the 
installation of the improvements thereon in the year 1951 
(R. 83). Mr. Wright and Mr. Benedict, expert witnesses for 
the appellants, assumed in their appraisals that the plats 
might not have been filed until 195 3 (R. 112). Mr. Werner 
Kiepe, an expert witness, called by the state of Utah who 
v1as well acquainted with demands for residential property of 
this type, testified that in his opinion the demand for resi-
dential property was such that the owners of the property 
would have proceeded with the development and sale on the 
south side of the canyon, including the Bird & Evans property 
in the year 1954 (R. 154). 
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On July 11, 1951, the state instituted condemnation pro· 
ceedings to condemn certain lands for the purpose of con-
structing a state park. They took substantially all of the Wag. 
ner Improvement Company property on the north side of 
the canyon, and a portion of that on the south including all 
of the land which lay between the Bird & Evans property 
and the existing residential area of Salt Lake City. The land 
taken by the condemnation proceedings is shown on the ap-
pendix attached hereto. It will be noted from an examination 
thereof that the condemnation action took the land right up 
to, but not including the Bird & Evans property. 
As has been stated before, all parties are agreed that as 
a result of the condemnation of a portion of the subdivision 
of which it was a part, the Bird & Evans property suffered 
substantial damages. Mr. Werner Kiepe testified that in his 
opinion as a direct result of the condemnation action the Bird 
& Evans property had been diminished in value by $9,600.00. 
Mr. Edward M. Ashton, another appraiser for the state, esti-
mated the diminution in value at $14,000.00. Mr. Ralph 
Wright and Mr. Joseph Benedict, appraisers for the appellants, 
placed the figure for diminution of value at $58,000.00 and 
$57,500.00 respectively. The jury determined the amount to 
be $30,500.00. 
The reason for this diminution in value of Bird & Evans 
property as a result of the condemning of a portion of the 
subdivision is obvious. Before the condemnation it had be.en 
part and parcel of a large and exclusive subdivision for which 
it had. contributed substantial sums of money for planning 
and development. The restrictive covenants binding both upon 
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it and the owners of the balance of the land in the sub-
division required the use of the land only for high class resi-
dential purposes. The owners of the other lots were required 
by this agreement to aid in and contribute to the installation 
of the improvements which were necessary before the land 
could be sold as subdivision property. Immediately after the 
condemnation all of these advantages were gone. The money 
spent for planning was down the drain. The advantages in 
the installation of improvements resulting from the reciprocal 
agreements were gone. If the owners of the Bird & Evans 
property, or any other person that cared to purchase the prop-
erty from them on the market, desired to use it for residential 
purposes, its highest and best use, they had to start over with 
planning and development. They had to bring utilities and 
other improvements entirely at their own expense from a con-
siderable distance in order to qualify the property for resi-
dential purposes. Obviously, as all parties agreed the market 
value of the Bird & Evans property for residential subdivision 
purposes was materially decreased. 
The nature of the damage to the Bird & Evans property 
was exactly the same in kind and character, although somewhat 
more severe in degree, as the damage to the portion of the 
Wagner Improvement property lying immediately south of 
the portion condemned as shown on the appendix. The State 
of Utah stipulated to a judgment against itself for the damages 
to the above mentioned portion of the Wagner Improvement 
tract not taken (see judgment of condemnation in the Deere 
estate case attached to this record.*) They resist damages to the 
Bird & Evans tract only on the ground of diversity of owner- • 
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ship, in spite of the fact that there existed the reciprocal agree-
ments, in spite of the fact that they were all parts of a com-
mon subdivision and in spite of the fact that the damages were 
exactly the same in nature. 
(*Charles D. Wiman and Burton F. Peek, Trustees, ap-
pear as the owners of the Wagner Improven1ent Cotnpany 
tract in the Decree as these trustees took the property over for 
liquidation after condemnation was commenced because of a 
tax advantage from . having the trustees liquidate rather than 
the corporation.) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE CLAIM OF THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS WAS 
PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BEFORE THE COURT. 
POINT TWO 
THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS ARE ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT FOR THE CONDEMNATION AND DE-
STRUCTION OF THEIR RECIPROCAL COVENANTS. 
POINT THREE 
THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS ARE NOT BARRED 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE CLAIM OF THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS WAS 
PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BEFORE THE COURT. 
In the respondent's Motion to Dismiss made to the court 
immediate! y before trial of the action started, the first ground 
of the Motion was that the appellant was not properly before 
the court and that its remedy lay with the Board of Examiners. 
This point has already been determined by this court on inter-
mediate appeal in State v. Bird & Evans, Inc., 265 Pac. (2d) 
639. There the court held that our counterclaim was properly 
filed and that we were not precluded from recovering because 
of the fact that the claim of Bird & Evans as to its property ac-
tually taken had been litigated to judgment. 
Neither the case of Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 Pac. (2d) 
907 or State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac. 
( 2d) 502, have any applicability here. In Hjorth v. Whittenburg 
the plaintiff was seeking a judgment against the road commis-
sioners in a separate action. The court held that their remedy, 
if any there was, lay with the Board of Examiners. In this 
case, however, we are properly before the Court in an action 
which the State itself started. We have filed our Counterclaim 
under the provisions of Section 78-34-7 U.C.A., 1953, which 
provides as follows: 
HAll persons in occupation of, or having or claiming 
an interest in, any of the property described in the com-
plaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though 
not named, may appear, plead and defend, each in re-
spect to his own property or interest, or that claimed 
11 
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by him, in the sames manner as if nan1ed in the com-
plaint.'' 
We are seeking to have our damages assessed under the pro-
visions of Section 78-34-10, U.C.A., 1953 which provides as 
follows: 
ttThe court, jury or referee must hear such legal 
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to the 
procedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
( 1) The value of the property sought to be con-
demned and all improvements thereon appertaining 
to the realty, and of each and every separate estate 
or interest herein; and if it consists of different par-
cels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or 
interest therein shall be separately assessed. 
( 2) If the property sought to be condemned con-
stitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages 
which will accrue to the portiop not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the por-
tion sought to be condemned and the construction 
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff. 
( 3) If the property, though no part thereof is 
taken, will be damaged by the construction of the 
proposed i~provement, the amount of such dam-
ages. * * * * " 
Certainly if this court felt that we could not properly have 
our claim for damages adjudicated by the courts, it would 
have dismissed the action on the intermediate appeal and 
would not have remanded it to proceed in accordance with 
that opinion which held that the counterclaim was properly 
filed. It may be that the state has abandoned this position as 
counsel did not argue it strenuously, however, if it is urged 
12 
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in the answering brief, we will argue the question more ex-
tensively in a reply brief. 
POINT TWO 
THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS ARE ENTITLED TO 
JUDGlVIENT FOR THE CONDEMNATION AND DE-
STRUCTION OF THEIR RECIPROCAL COVENANTS. 
It is the position of appellants that the agreements reached 
between the Wagner Improvement Company and Bird & 
Evans gave each reciprocal rights in the other's property, which 
rights have been condemned in this action. These reciprocal 
rights having been condemned and extinguished, the resulting 
damage is the diminution in value of the dominant tenancy. 
Each tract of land had an interest in the other arising by con-
tract and by a course of dealing over many years. This right 
was to have the other lands devoted to residential purposes 
and to have the other lands bear their proportionate share of 
the costs of the development of the subdivision. These rights 
constituted reciprocal covenants which are clearly property 
rights. 
In regard to the condemnation of reciprocal covenants and 
the right of the owner of the land not taken to recover for 
destruction of such reciprocal covenants, the following lan-
guage is found in Volume 2 of Nichlos on Eminent Domain, 
page 81: 
(CThe rna jority view holds that such a restriction 
often characterized as an equitable servitude consti-
13 
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tutes property in the constitutional se~1s~ and mus.t be 
compensated for if taken. Such restncttons constitute 
equitable easements on the land restrict:d a.nd when 
such land is taken for a public use that wlll v1olate the 
restrictions, there is a taking of the property of the 
owners of the land for the benefit of which the restric-
tions were imposed. The owners of such property can-
not maintain proceedings for damages against the 
original owner or enforce the restrictions against the 
condemnor, but they are entitled to an award of com-
pensation for the destruction of their easements." 
The following language is found in 1 Lewis on Eminent 
Domain 429: 
((When property subject to a restrictive covenant is 
taken for public use, the owner of the property for 
whose benefit the restriction is imposed, is entitled to 
compensation." 
In the case of Johnstone v. Detroit G.H.&M. Railroad 
Co., a Michigan case, reported at 222 N.W. 325, the court 
stated: 
((The principal question is whether because of the 
proposed violations of the restrictions the state must 
pay compensation to the owners of other lots in the 
subdivision whose land is not actually and physically 
taken under our Constitution, Article 13, No. 1, which 
prohibits the taking of private property for public 
use without just compensation therefor." 
In disposing of this case the Court went on to say on 
page 331: 
((The claim of counsel for defendants that the de-
struction of the easements at bar is by virtue of police 
power and not under the power of eminent domain is 
answered by Allen v. City of Detroit, supra. Their con-
14 
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tention that there is a difference in the character and 
effect of the power of eminent domain when exercised 
by the state than when usen by a municipality is not 
tenable. It is the same attribute of sovereignty, what-
ever the agency through which it is exercised. * * * * '' 
"It is therefore held that owners of property in a 
subdivision in which under a general plan the property 
is restricted to specific uses and in which the restrictions 
are valid, subsisting and enforcible against the lands 
in the hands of private owners, are entitled to compen-
sation upon the taking of any part of such subdivision 
for public use in violation of such restrictions. That 
aside from nominal damage for destruction of the ease-
ment, the compensation is measured by the actual 
diminution in value of the premises of such owner 
as a result of the use to which the property taken is put, 
and that in determining such diminution the effect by 
way of benefit as well as by way of injury of such use, 
is to be taken into such account." 
The state of New York is much more restrictive than is 
the state of Utah in the question of what damages may be 
recovered wl!ere no part of the land is taken. The state of Utah 
will permit recovery where a railroad injures property by emit-
ting cinders, smoke, vibration, etc. The state of New York 
will not. However, in the case of Flynn v. New York, W & B 
Ry Co., et al, 112 N.E. 913, the railroad was actually built 
across a piece of property subject to a restrictive covenant 
in favor of the plaintiff's property that the condemned property 
would be used only for residential purposes. In allowing re-
covery in that case, the Court stated: 
((These restrictive covenants create a property right 
and make a direct and compensational the damages 
which otherwise would be consequential and noncom-
15 
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pensational. Radcliffs Ex'rs v. Mayor, etc. of Brooklyn, 
4 N.Y., 195; 53 Am. Dec. 357; Uline v. N.Y.C. and 
H.R.R.R. Co., 101 N.Y. 98; 4 N.E. 536; 54 Am. 
Rep. 661. No matter how unpleasant a neighbor _the 
railroad may prove, if it takes no property by physical 
appropriation, it is not chargeable with damages for 
impaired values due only to proximity. But something 
in the nature of an easement of privacy over another's 
land may be acquired by covenant in order that one 
may live apart from the disagreeable sights and sounds 
of business if one desires, and if that right has a value 
and the railroad subtracts a portion thereof by build-
ing on the restricted land, it is difficult to conceive 
why compensation should not follow. * * * *" 
t (The right of the property owner is measured by 
the depreciation in value which his land sustains." 
In the case of Britton v. School District, a Missouri case, 
44 S.W. (2d) 33, the plaintiff was granted an injunction against 
the school board to restrain the board from building a school 
house on lands in violation of restrictive covenants until they 
condemned the reciprocal rights of the owners of adjoining 
lots. 
A similar case was at issue in the case of State v.Mulloy, 
also a Missouri case, reported at 61 S.W. (2d) 741. There the 
court stated: 
nThe plaintiffs in the injunction suit (relators here) 
are owners of lots in University Heights Subdivision. 
The defendant school district was proceeding to erect 
and use buildings and grounds in such subdivision for 
school purposes in violation of valid building restric-
tions excluding and prohibiting such use. It is the 
well settled law of this state that where the deeds of 
conveyance impose valid restrictions on the la11ds within 
16 
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a given area, then each lot and the owner of the same 
has an easen1ent in each and all other lots affected by 
the restrictions, which easement is a property right 
to be protected by injunction at the owner's instance 
restraining and preventing violations of the building 
restrictions. Such building restrictions and the rights 
arising therefrom are subordinate to the right of emi-
nent domain and can be extinguished by condemna-
tion proceedings. If that suit was between individuals, 
the plaintiffs would be entitled absolutely to the in-
junctive relief prayed for and damages could be con-
sidered, but this defendant is clothed with the power 
of eminent domain and may exercise that right by 
condemnation and for that reason only this Court did 
not grant at once and absolutely the injunction prayed 
for. The easement in plaintiffs' favor in the land which 
defendant proposes to use for school purposes is within 
the protection of the constitutional provisions which 
provide that private property cannot be taken for pri-
vate use with or without compensation and that (pri-
vate property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation, such compensation shall 
be ascertained by a jury or board of commissioners' in 
the manner provided by law." 
The same rule applies in Federal Courts. In the case of 
U.S. v. Gossler, from the U. S. District of Oregon, reported 
at 60 Fed. Supp. 971, the Court said: 
((If payment were made for a specific interest such 
as the fee title out of the aggregate, the Government 
would abrogate the other interests without paying 
monetary consideration therefor. Such a result does not 
satisfy the demands of the amendment. The United 
States is liable to the owner of easement appurtenant 
in a suit condemning the fee of the servient estate." 
17 
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In the case of Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 14?, Atl. 245, 
this same subject was treated by tpe court as follows: 
((The plaintiff also contends that these restrictions, 
insofar as they prohibit the erection of a high school 
or other municipal building upon the restricted prop-
erty, are void as against public policy. The argun1ent in 
support of this contention is that no contractual agree-
ment between the owners of property should be per-
mitted to prevent the use of that property by an agency 
of the state when its use is required in the exercise of 
a governmental function, that to require the state to 
make compensation for the right taken would interfere 
with this governmental function, an~ therefore should 
not be permitted. The fallacy of the argument lies 
in the assumption of its minor premise that the require-
merit that the state compensate the owner of the domi-
nant tenement for the taking of his interest in the 
servient tenement actually interferes with the exercise 
of any governmental function. There is, of course, a 
clear distinction between the rights of the private 
owner of land which is subject to a restrictive easement 
and those of a governmental agency which requires 
for public purposes the use of the land in violation of 
the restriction. The private owner may not violate the 
restriction; if he attempts to do so, he may be restrained 
by injunction. The governmental agency may not be 
restrained from making such use of the property as 
the public purpose for which it is acquired may require, 
but, if that involves the taking of private property, it 
must make compensation for the same. When, there-
fore, property subject to a restrictive easement is taken 
for a public use, it has been held that the owner of 
the property for whose benefit the restrtiction is im-
posed is entitled to compensation. Ladd v. Boston, 
151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858, 21 Am. St. Rep. 481; 
Flynn v. R.R., 218 N.Y. 140, 112, N.E. 913, Ann. 
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Cas. 1918B, 588; Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 
N.W. 317, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 890; Peters v. Buckner, 
288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W. 1024; and note to same in 17 
A.L.R. 543; Kirby v. School Board (1896) 1 Ch. 43,7; 
Long Eaton Recreation Co. v. Midland Ry. Co., (1902) 
2 K. B. 574; 1 Lewis Em. Dom. (3rd Ed.), Sec. 224; 
1 Nichols, Em. Dom. ( 2d) Sec. 121. 
Fron1 the foregoing it appears that the law is well settled 
to the effect that where the state condemns land which is sub-
ject to reciprocal covenants with other land, the owners of 
the land not taken are entitled to recover damages if the 
value of their land is diminished by the taking of the land 
subject to the reciprocal agreement and the agreements thus 
extinguished. In the next succeeding section, we will discuss 
more at length the question of whether or not the Bird & 
Evans and the Wagner tracts actually had reciprocal rights 
one in the other which had been destroyed by this condemna-
tion action. 
POINT THREE 
TI-IE COUNTERCLAIMANTS ARE NOT BARRED 
FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES BY THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
The state does not deny the existence of the agreement 
between Bird & Evans and Wagner Improvement Company for 
the development of the Oak Hills Subdivision. They merely 
maintain that as such agreement created an interest in land 
and was not reduced to writing it is within the provisions 
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of the Statute of Frauds. It is true that the agreement between 
the two companies was not reduced to a written document 
subscribed by both parties and it is understandable why 
that was not done. They had jointly hired legal counsel and 
engineering services. Each had proceeded to pay its propor-
tionate share of the same. The restrictive covenants were re-
duced to writing but had not actually been signed and filed 
except as to the plats on the north side of the canyon. The 
appellants, however, claim that the Statute of Frauds does not 
constitute a defense for the State in this case for two reasons. 
First: because the agreements are taken out of the Statute 
of Frauds by substantial part performance; and Second: the 
State not being a party to such agreements is not in a position 
to rely on the Statute of Frauds as a defense. 
It is the well settled law in this State that substantial 
part performance of an oral agreement takes said agreement 
from under the operation of the Statute of Frauds. In this 
regard see Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Ut 480; Lynch et al v. 
Cogivlio et al, 17 Ut 106; and Van Natta v. Heywood et al, 
57 Ut 376. 
There has been substantial part performance in this case 
of the agreement between the two parties. The planning work 
on the entire subdivision was completed. Bird & Evans had 
paid a proportionate part of this. Wagner Improvement Com-
pany had had advantage of this planning servic-e on the plats 
which had actually been :filed and the lots sold prior to the 
time of the condemnation action. Wagner Improvement Com-
pany, therefore, would have been in no position to back dov1n 
from the agreement even had it so desired. The facts, how-
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ever, are clear that it would have been equally to the advantage 
of Wagner Improvement Company and Bird & Evans, Inc., 
to go through with the subdivision had not the State inter-
vened, therefore, it is inconceivable that there would have 
been any repudiation of the contract by Wagner Improvement 
Company even if there had been no part performance. 
The State, however, is in no position to attack the con-
tract between Wagner Improvement Company and Bird & 
Evans, Inc., collaterally as they have attempted to do in this 
action. It is a well settled rule of law that the defense of the 
Statute of Frauds is not available to anyone not a party to the 
contract. 
In the case of Leibowitz v. Central National Bank, 60 
N.E. (2d) 727, an action was brought against a third party 
for wrongful interference with the performance of a contract. 
The defendant claimed as a defense that the contract was 
within the Statute of Frauds, and it, therefore, could not be 
held liable for interfering with the contract. The situation is 
almost an exact parallel to that presented here. In disposing of 
that case, the Court stated: 
((It is argued that plaintiff is prevented by Sec. 8384 
General Code, The Statute of Frauds, from maintain-
ing this action. That section might be available to a 
defendant in an action between the parties. It is a 
mere defense. It is not a matter of substance. With 
it the defendant in this instance can have no concern 
because in an action based upon the contract itself such 
a defense might not have been alleged or insisted upon." 
The same matter was before the Supreme Court of Wyo-
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ming in the case of Laverents v. Gattis, 150 Pac. (2d) 867. In 
disposing of the contention, the Court stated: 
uwe think, moreover, that the legal conclusions 
which counsel for plaintiff draws from the fact that 
no written assignment was made, are not well taken. 
He states that tit is almost elementary that the assign-
ment of a purchaser's interest under a land contract 
must be in writing to be effective.' And he cites us, 
among other cases, to Wilkie v. Womble, 90 N.C. 
254; Connor v. Tippett, 57 Miss. 594. These cases are 
not at all in point. They deal with the enforcement 
of an oral contract relating to real estate as between 
the parties themselves. We have no such case here. 
In the case at bar, Tucker was a stranger to the oral 
contract made between the plaintiff and the defendants. 
It is a general rule that the defense of the statute of 
frauds is personal and cannot be interposed by strangers 
to the agreement. 27 C.J. 304; 3 7 C.J.S., Frauds, 
Statute of, Sec. 391, p. 715. In 49 Am. Jur. 896, it is 
stated: 
C( {The defense of the statute of frauds is a personal 
one available only to a party to the contract to which 
the statute is alleged to apply and his representatives 
and privies. The statute is intended for the protection 
of the party sought to be charged. It does not make it 
inherently wrong for a party to enter into an oral 
contract concerning a subject matter coming within 
the meaning of the statute. In fact, in most jurisdic-
tions, by its terms or by necessary implication, the 
statute merely makes an oral contract voidable as a 
protection to those who might otherwise suffer by rea-
son of pretended oral promises; generally, it may be 
said that the statute is not intended to be the means of 
preventing voluntary fulfilment of a moral obligation 
created by the oral agreement. Its benefits cannot be 
claimed by one who is not a party or privy to the oral 
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contract and is not sought to be charged personally 
on such contract. 
n 'As has been said, it does not rest with a stranger 
to say that the parties to the oral agreement will not 
abide by the same regardless of the statute; it is for 
the party himself (or his privy) to decide whether 
he shall avail himself of the defense. If he feels that 
he should discharge the moral obligation although he 
may have a perfect legal defense, no stranger or third 
party not privy to the contract can complain. This rule 
applies even under statutes which provide that such 
agreements are void unless reduced to writing and 
signed by the party charged. It ordinarily prevents even 
creditors of a party to the contract from asserting the 
benefit of the contract.' " 
To this same effect see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Mills, 
146 F (2d) 694; Bradley v. Hall, an Alabama case, 195 So. 
883; Sun Insurance Co. v. Thomas (Ky.) 90 S.W. (2d) 675, 
Weitz v. Gordon (Miss) 184 So. 798; Alder v. Pilot Ind., 57 
N.Y. Sup (2d) 539; Caldwell v. Caldwell (Tenn) 133· S.W. 
(2d) 1009. 
CONCLUSION 
Once again we repeat the question here is not whether 
the counterclaimants have been damaged. Everyone agrees 
that they have been damaged, and the jury, having heard the 
conflicting evidence as to the amount, fixed the figure at 
$30,500.00. The only question is whether or not the damages 
are of such a nature as to be compensable. The State has ad-
mitted in its Stipulation with the Deere estate that such dam-
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ages would be compensable if the land were in comn1on owner-
ship. It is the position of the appellants that the diversity of own-
ership makes no difference here because of the recoprical rights 
held by the owners in each others' lands due to the joint 
agreements and the work done on planning and developing 
of Oak Hills Subdivision. These agreements were valid and 
subsisting and are taken out of the Statute of Frauds by sub-
stantial performance. Further the State is not in a position 
to rely on the Statute of Frauds as a defense in this case. 
Therefore, it appears that the Court was in error in granting the 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and that 
that this Court should order the verdict of the jury reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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